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06 June 1985 
Geoffrey Butler, Esq. 
Utah Supreme Court 
Room 332 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Utah v. Vijil, No, 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
20111 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, the 
appellant wishes to advise the Court of certain supplemental citations 
which are pertinent to his appeal. 
First, at page seven (7) of the Appellantfsi Reply Brief, refer-
ence is made to the procedures of Title 78, Chapter 4pb of the Utah Code. 
The procedures applicable to the present case are outlined at section 78-
45b-5 for, as the Notice of Support Debt shows in its! caption, this case 
was a proceeding without a court order. Consequently, it is procedures 
in section 78-45b-5 which must be examined to determine whether federal 
law preempts their application to a Reservation-domiciled Navajo Indian. 
I 
Second, the appellant draws the Court's attention to the recent 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kerr-McGee Corporation v. Navajo Tribe of 
Indians, No. 84-68. As the decision deals with the T)ower of the Navajo 
Tribe to apply their tax laws to non-Indian corporations, it does not 
correspond to any specific argument made in the appellant's briefs. How-
ever, the appellant does believe that the Court's stirong affirmation of 
tribal, especially Navajo, sovereignty is worthy of attention in any case, 
such as the present one, where tribal sovereignty is at issue. 
Yours sincerely, 
Steven Boc 
Attorney at Lajw 
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cc: Mark Wainwright, Esq. 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Herb Yazzie, Esq. 
NAVAJO NATION DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
Post Office Drawer 2010 
Window Rock, Arizona 86515 
Bruce K. Halliday, Esq. 
San Juan County Courthouse 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
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Tb* ijfiabot ctxm&tmm BO part of th« opotioti of th« Cocxrt bat hai been pre-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
KERR-McGEE CORP- u NAVAJO TRI$E OF 
INDIANS ETAL. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
No. 84-68. Argued February 25,1985—Decided April 16, 1985 
The Tribal Council of respondent Navajo Tribe enacted ordinances im-
posing taxes on the value of leasehold iuteicsLa in tribal lands and on 
receipts from the sale of property produced or extracted or the sale of 
services within those lands. Petitioner, a mineral lessee on the Navajo 
Reservation, brought an action in Federal District Court, claiming that 
the taxes were invalid without approval of the Secretary of the Interior 
(Secretary). The District Court agreed and enjoined the Tribe from en-
forcing the tax laws against petitioner. The Court of-Appeals reversed, 
holding that no federal statute or principle of law mandated approval by 
the Secretary. 
Htld: The Secretary's approval of the taxes in question is not required. 
Pp. 2-6. 
(a) While 116 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 requires a 
tribal constitution written under the Act to be approved by the Secre-
tary, the Act does not require the constitution to condition the power to 
tax on the Secretary's approval In any event, the Act does not govern 
tribes, Hke the Navajo, that declined to accept its provisions. And 
there is nothing to indicate that Congress intended to recognize as legiti-
mate only those tribal taxes authorised by constitutions written under 
the Act. Pp.2-4. 
(b) Nor does the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 198^ require the Sec-
ondary's cppnnral of the Navajo taxes. WhQe f4 of the Act subjects 
mineral leases issued under the Act to regulations promulgated by'the 
Secretary
 f the regulations have not required that triW taxes im mineral 
production be ml Knitted for his approval. In enacting 149 Congress 
could ptupeily make a distinction between a tribe acting as a cofameidal 
partner in selling the right to use its land for mineral production and 
n EERR-McGEE CORP. u NAVAJO TTtlBH} 
SyQabos 
acting as a sovereign in imposing taxes on activities within its jurisdic-
tion- And even aaprming that the Secretary could review tribal taxes 
on mineral production, it does not follow that be must do so. Pp. 4-5. 
(c) Nor do statutes requiring the Secretary's supervision in other con-
texts tadkste that Congress has limited the Navajo Tribal Council's 
authority to tax non-Indians. Use power to tax members and non-
msmbers of a tribe alike is an essential attribute of the tr i l^ self-govern-
ment that the Federal Government is committed to promote. P. 5. 
731 F. 2d 597, affirmed. 
BURGER, C. J M delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members 
joined, except POWELL, J., who took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of the case. 
NOTICE: TO* opfafeo ts «abWt to formal rrnckxi before wibKeatkto in tho 
Hottimaaif prtat attbt UmUd StMtm E*oorti. Rfdtn t n nqcmsud to 
i»Crfy tfco Koporur erf Dacawa, Supren* Court of the UniUd State*, Wash-
ington, D. C-2K4&, of say trpo^repfaeai cr other farnml errors, in order 
that earrtctjam may bo o « k bofort tbo prtimamry print goes to presa. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-68 
KERR-McGEE CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. 
NAVAJO TRIBE OF INDIANS, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATEfe COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[April 16,19861 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
***n xisiiu-I ZSL\J2L^L\ *n is=re Vrsslffr *i** ^srso "^rb* 
ol Innians may tax business activities comnrced on its ianu 
without first obtaining the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior. 
i 
In 1978, the Navajo Tribal Council, the governingbody of 
the Navajo Tribe of Indians, enacted two ordinances impos-
ing taxes known as the Possessory Interest Tax and the Busi-
ness Activity Tax. The Possessory Interest Tax is meas-
ured by the value of leasehold interests in tribal lands; the 
tax rate is 8% of the value of those interests. The Business 
Activity Tax is assessed on receipts from the sale of property 
produced or extracted within the Navajo Nation, and from 
the sale of services within the Nation; a tax rate of 5% is 
applied after subtracting a standard deduction and speci-
fied expensesr^The tax laws apply to both Navajo and non-
jlndian businesses, with dissatisfied taxpayers enjoying the 
right of appeal to the Navajo Tax Commission and the 
Navsjo Ccurt of Appeals. 
The Navajo Tribe, uncertain whether federal approval was 
required, submitted the two tax laws to the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs of the Department of the Interior. The Bureau. 
84-68—OPINION 
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informed the Tribe that no federal statute or regulBtion 
required the Department of the Interior to approve or disap-
prove the taxes. 
Before any taxes were coDected, petitioner, a substantial 
mineral lessee on the Navajo Reservation, brought this ac-
tion seeking to invalidate the taxes. Petitioner Claimed in 
the United States District Court for the District jrf Arizona 
that the Navajo taxes were invalid without approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior. The District Court Agreed and 
permanently enjoined the Tribe from enforcing itjs tax laws 
against petitioner. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ni^ ith Circuit 
reversed. 731 F. 2d 597 (1984). Relying on [Southland 
Royalty. Co, v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 715 F. 2d 486 (CA10 
1983), it held that no federal statute or principle ot law man-
dated Secretarial approval.1 
We granted certiorari 469 U. S. (1984). [We affirm. 
II 
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130 (1982), 
we held that the "power to tax is an essential attribute of 
Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of 
self-government and territorial management.n id., at 137. 
Congress, of course, may erect "checkpoints th^t must be 
cleared before a tribal tax can take effect." Id., attl55. The 
issue in this case is whether Congress has enacted! legislation 
requiring Secretarial approval of Navajo tax law$. 
Petitioner suggests that the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. $461 et seq., is such a law. 
Section 16 of the IRA authorises any tribe on a reservation to 
adopt a constitution and bylaws, subject to the approval of 
the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U. S. C. 5476. The Act, 
*Ti* Ninth Circuit reacted petttfaoerV ether e o c i ^ 
todndad Comnwrce Cbcwe md contractual ehaHesgts to the two taxes. 
Petitioner fcu not sought review of this acpeet of the Coajtof Appeals' 
Judgment, 
84-6S-OPINION 
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however, does not provide that 2 tribal constitution must 
condition the power to tax on Secretarial approval Indeed, 
the terms of the IRA do not govern tribes, like the Navajo, 
which declined to accept its provisions. 25 U. S. C. §478. 
Many tribal constitutions written under the IRA in the 
1930*8 called for Secretarial approval of tax laws affecting 
non-Indians. See, e. g., Constitution and Bjdaws of the 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe of South Dakota, Art. 4, § 1(h) (1935). 
But there were exceptions to this practice. For example, 
the 1937 Constitution and By-laws of the Saginaw Chippewa 
Indian Tribe of Michigan authorized the Tribal Council, with-
out Secretarial approval, to "create and maintain a tribal 
council fund by . . . levying taxes or assessments against 
members or non-members.n Art 4, § 1(g). Tfrus the most 
that can be said about this period of constitution writing is 
that the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in assisting the drafting of 
->*ribal constitutions, had a policy of including provisions for 
Secretarial approval; but that policy was not mandated by 
Congress. 
Nor do we agree that Congress intended to recognize as 
legitimate only those tribal taxes authorized by constitutions 
written under the IRA.1 Long before the IRA was enacted, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee acknowledged h^e validity of 
a tax imposed by the Chickasaw Nation on non-Indians. See 
S. Rep. No. 698, 45th Cong., 3d Sess., 1-2 (1^79). And in 
1934, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior pub-
lished a formal opinion stating that a tribe possesses "the 
power of taxation [which] may be exercised ovet members of 
the tribe and over nonmembers." Fowert oflitdian Tribes, 
55 I. D. 14, 46. The 73rd Congress, in passing the IRA to 
advance tribal self-government, see WUliamq v. Lee, 358 
JU9ervationfM7V. S. 1M, 152-154 (15S0), wt uotamed taxes impoeedon 
oomMSobsn by the CotrQto end Lctxnnn Tribes rren tboofh tba Tribes 
rwmrn not orgjmiiad under-the IRA 
S4-6S-OPINION 
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U. S. 217, 220 (1859), did nothing to limit the established, 
pre-existing power of the Navnjos to levy taxes. 
* Some tribes that adopted constitutions in the ea l^y years of 
the IRA may be dependent on the Government in a way that 
the Navajos are not However, such tribes are free, with 
the backing of the Interior Department, to amend their con-
stitutions to remove the requirement of Secretarial approval 
. See, e. gr., Revised Constitution and Bylaws of Jthe Missis-
sippi Band of Choctaw Indians, Art 8, § l(r) (1975). 
Petitioner also argues that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act 
of 1938, 52 Stat. 847,25 U. S. C. §3S6a et seg., requires Sec-
retarial approval of Navajo tax laws. Sections 1 ^ hrough 3 of 
the 1988 Act establish procedures for leasing oil knd gas in-
terests on tribal lands. And §4 provides that *j[a]U opera-
tions under any oil, gas, or other mineral lease issued pursu-
ttitto the [Act] shall be subject to the rules and regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior." £5 U. S. C. 
§336d. Under this grant erf authority, the Sectary has 
issued comprehensive regulations governing the Operation of 
ml and gas leases. . See 25 CFR pt 211 (1984). The Secre-
tary, however, does not demand that tribal laws taxing min-
eral production be submitted for his approval 
Petitioner contends that the Secretary's decision not to 
review such tax laws is inconsistent with the statute. In 
we emphasized the difference between a tribe's 
*role as commercial partner,'* and its "role as Sovereign." 
455 U. &f at 145-146. The tribe acts as a commercial part-
ner when it agrees to sell the right to the use of its land for 
mineral production, but the tribe sets as a sovereign when it 
imposes a tax on economic activities within its jurisdiction* 
J&, at 146; ct White v. Massachusetts Council pfComtrue' 
*k*Efnploy*nj7*.,4lto\J.& Plainly 
Congress, in passing f 4 of the 1838 Act, «mld make this 
^Bvenaasmning thfit the Secretary could review tribal laws 
taxing mineral production, it does not follow that he must do 
84-68-OPINION 
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so. We are not inclined to impose upon the Secretary a duty 
that he has determined is not needed to satisfy the 1338 Act's 
basic pttrpose-*-to maximize tribal revenues from reservation 
lands. See S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 
(1937). Thus, in light of our obligation to "tread lightly in 
the absence of clear indications of legislative indent,n Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 60 (19f78), vre will 
not interpret a grant of authority to regulate leasing opera-
tions as a command to the Secretary to review pvery tribal 
tax relating to mineral production.3 I 
Finally, we do not believe that statutes requiring Secre-
tarial supervision in other contexts, see, e. <?., 25 U. S. C. 
§§81, 311-321, reveal that Congress has limited the Navajo 
Tribal Council's authority to tax non-Indians. As we noted 
in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 4^ 2 U. S. 324 
(1983), the Federal Government is "firmly comrpitted to the 
goal of promoting tribal self-government.n Id.* at 334-335; 
see, e. g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 Stat 77, 25 
U. S. C. § 1451 et seq. The power to tax mempers and non-
Indians alike is surely an essential attribute of such self-
government; the Navajos can gain independence from the 
Federal Government only by financing their own police force, 
schools, and social programs. See President's Statement on 
Indian Policy, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc' 98^99 (Jan. 24, 
1983). 
in 
The Navajo government has been called "probably the 
most elaborate" among tribes. H. R. Rep. No. 78, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1969). The legitimacy of the Navajo 
Tribal Council, the freely elected governing body of the 
•Section 2 of the 1838 Act pcptidea a limited exemption for tribes org*-
atod tmder the IRA 25 U. S. C. 1898b. Because we ^ oodnde that the 
1938 Act does not rtqnire the Secretary to renew tribal taxes, however, 
the Ntnjo Tribe's dedakm not to accept the IRA ii irre^ erazxt. 
84-68-OPINION 
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Navajos, is beyond question*4 See, e. g.9 25 U. S. C. 
55635(b), 637, 638. We agree with the Court of Appeals 
that neither Congress nor the Navajos have fotmd it neces-
sary to subject the Tribal Council's tax laws to review by the 
Secretary of the Interior; accordingly, the judgment is 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion in this case. 
*Tb* Tribal Comal has 88 member* who art ejected e v ^ four years. 
33*re are approximate^ 
persons voted in the last tribal flection in 1962. 
